Abstract. The usual mechanism for modeling learning in spatially structured evolutionary games has to date been imitation of some successful neighbor. However, it seems natural that individuals hesitate to imitate their neighbor's acts, specially if they can imply high costs. Here we study the effect of incorporating resistance to imitation on these models. Our framework is the spatial Continuous Prisoner's Dilemma. For this evolutionary game, it has been reported that occasional errors in the imitation process can explain the emergence of cooperation from a non-cooperative initial state. In this work, we show that this only occurs for particular regimes of low costs of cooperation. Furthermore, we display how resistance gets greater the range of scenarios where cooperative individuals can invade selfish populations. In this context, where resistance to imitation can be interpreted as a general rule of gradual learning, our results show that the less that is learnt in a single step from a successful neighbors, the larger the degree of global cooperation finally attained. In general, the effect of step-by-step learning can be more efficient for the evolution of cooperation than a full blast one.
Introduction
The evolution of cooperation has been a challenging problem since Darwin [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] . With sophisticated tools of game into the population. However in models in which individuals can exhibit variable degrees of cooperation, mutation can be certainly a source of generating diversity. The study of cooperative behavior in a quantitative way rather than a qualitative way has been crucial in dealing with the problem of evolution and the stability of cooperation. The first studies on this issue [8, 9] considered the evolution of degrees of cooperation by interpolating payoffs between the discrete outcomes of the classical Prisoner's Dilemma model (PD). A natural approach to model variable levels of cooperation was introduced later [10, 11] . Iteration and spatial structures based on continuous cooperative investment have also been addressed [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] , [20, 21] provide a complete review of previous researches on the stability in cooperation in variable-investment systems. Developing some of the ideas of [10] , and following the classical scheme of [22] for spatial evolutionary games, Killingback et al. [12] introduced the spatial Continuous Prisioner's Dilemma (CPD). The joint consideration of continuous cooperative investments and spatial structured populations in their model represents an important advance in explaining the evolutionary origin of cooperation [21] .
The strategy update rule considered in [22] was originally designed for the discrete PD, where exact imitation is the only way to update strategies. In a social and economic context, where imitation is interpreted as learning [19] , it seems natural that individuals hesitate to imitate exactly the investment of a neighbor. In this work we investigate the effect of introducing some grade of resistance to imitation in the spatial CPD. This resistance leads to a process in which individuals learn step by step from their successful neighbors. For this purpose we employ the most elemental rule that can be used: Each individual updates her investment by averaging her current investment with the investment of her successful neighbor. In adverse conditions in which costs for cooperation are high, individuals have reason to avoid the blind imitation of higher-investors, despite how successful they can be. Counter-intuitively, we show that this wariness leads partial learning to being more efficient than a full blast imitation precisely in regimes of non-low costs of cooperation. The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we review the spatial CPD as well as we introduce gen-eral assumptions and the notation used throughout the paper. In section 3, we characterize the different payoff regimes according to the asymptotic behavior of the spatial CPD. In particular, we prove that previous results [12, ?] in which it is reported that cooperation gradually increases from a non-cooperative state correspond to particular payoff regimes that we classify as regimes of low cost. In section 4, we introduce resistance to imitation and explain how this mechanism operates for the maintenance and promotion of cooperation. We also provide the conditions in which higher-investment individuals can invade a population of selfish individuals. Section 5 summaries our conclusions. [21] . In order to determine the maximal possible investment, it is required to compute the optimal mutual investment x max that maximizes B(x) − C(x). In general, for all 0 < x < y < x max , one can verify the inequalities shown by [12] S(y, x) < S(x, x) < S(y, y) < S(x, y), (1) which are continuous versions of the well known conditions for the payoffs of the classical Prisoner's Dilemma [17] .
To avoid the problem of comparing investments in different scales, we only consider investments in [0, 1] . For that, it is sufficient to have x max ≥ 1, therefore (1) holds for any pair of investments 0 < x < y < 1.
Although the main results of this work cover general increasing-concave functions, the simulations shown throughout this paper are based on linear costs, namely, C(x) = Cx, and benefit functions of the form
with a, b > 0. These functions are typical of what might be expected in real biological situations [23, 24] and are basis functions in the literature of the CPD [12, 17, 19] . For these basis functions, one has x max = − log(C/(ab))/b, thus, x max ≥ 1 if and only if C < ab exp(−b). In our parametric analysis, we fix a and b and vary C between 0 and ab exp(−b). One additional remark:
when b → 0 + and a → +∞, with ab → B < ∞. In fact, for any investment 0 < x < 1, the convergence is very fast.
Therefore, linear benefit functions, used by [13, 14] , are an interesting limit case of the basis functions and, because of their simplicity, are especially considered in our analysis.
In the spatial CPD, individuals are placed on the nodes of a network and recollect payoffs from their pairwise interactions with their neighbors accordingly with a CPD.
The total payoff of each individual is given by the sum of these payoffs. At each time step, each individual updates her investment by imitating the investment of her neighbor (including herself) with the highest total payoff. Additionally, and this is an important ingredient in the model, [12] 
Asymptotics for different cost regimes
Let us analyze the evolution of the social network defined in Section 2 in the simplest scenario. First, we consider an initial condition with a single individual that invests
x < y in a group of y-individuals (individuals who invest y) and assume no mutations. In that case, the update rule is deterministic and we can compute analytically the evolution of the system. More precisely:
invades only its four nearest neighbors.
(ii) If (B(y)−B(x))/4 < C(y)−C(x) < (B(y)−B(x))/2, the x-individual spreads over the lattice, reaching a structure with the same shape of the cross with sawtooth boundaries showed by [25] .
spreads until the extinction of the y-individuals.
Assuming that cost and benefit are differentiable functions, and using the fact that they are increasing and concave, it is easy to establish
for all 0 < x < y < 1. Thus, the quotients C (1)/B (0) and 
For simplicity, sometimes we will not distinguish between low-medium and high-medium costs and we refer to both as medium costs. Notice that if the benefit is a linear func- The type of social network that we are studying typically reaches a steady state where the mean investment lightly fluctuates around a value, called the asymptotic mean investment [17, 19] . Thus, the promotion or sustaining of cooperation can be contrasted by comparing the asymptotic mean investment with the initial one. Figure 1 shows the typical evolution in time of the mean invest- correspond, respectively, to low costs, {δ, 1 8 B, 1 4 B − δ}, with δ = B/1000. The dashed lines and the last three snapshots to medium costs { 1 4 B + δ, 3 8 B, 1 2 B − δ}. The bottom solid line corresponds to high cost 
Effects of resistance to imitation on the evolution of cooperation
The above analysis was obtained when the strategy update rule is based on exact imitation. Now we consider weighted average as the way to update investments. Instead of focal individuals copying the best neighbor, each individuals updates her investment with a new one "be- ing is more efficient than hasty learning when the cost is medium or high and it is necessary to sustain cooperation (even in low levels) for high costs. 2. In high costs, occasional errors work against cooperation and even the resistance to imitation is unable to maintain cooperation. Figure 7 shows the typical effect of the resistance to imitation in adverse conditions in which simple mutations in the structured population are not sufficient to trigger high levels of cooperation.
In these scenarios of low and medium costs, with linear or strictly concave benefits, there always exists a value for the resistance parameter to raise cooperation to higher levels. Moreover, we observed through simulations, that any resistance level (0 < α < 1)) is enough to promote cooperation when costs are low. Medium levels of resistance may be required when costs are medium; the closer the cost is to the high cost threshold, the higher the level of resistance required.
Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the effect on the evolu- tice. From random initial conditions, the spatial structure promotes high investments only in low cost regimes. We observed fast transitions to low mean investments in lowmedium costs. It is interesting to notice that these transitions are discontinuous when the payoffs are linear functions. In regimes of high-medium cost the spatial structure is unable to keep the initial mean cooperation investment.
The lowest investment in the initial state dominates the system for any high-cost regime. When occasional errors in the imitating process are considered, cooperation emerges from a non-cooperative initial state only under a particular regime of low cost and strictly concave benefit. To observe this emergence, previously reported in the literature of the spatial CPD [12, 19] , negligible costs of cooperation [18] are required. For the rest of the regimes, the essential problem of cooperation remains: Occasional errors have no effect on the evolution of cooperation when costs are low and the benefit function is linear or when costs are low-medium. Moreover, they work against cooperation in high-medium and high costs.
Weighted average can be viewed as a step-by-step learning mechanism in the strategy update process that can prevent individuals from their costly acts. Amazingly, it is this aspect that offers important insight into the problem of origin and sustainment of cooperation. Our analysis explains how cooperation evolves and is maintained when gradual learning works in the spatial CPD. We have proved that the resistance to exact imitation has a significant effect on medium (low-medium and high-medium) cost and high cost regimes: The less that is learnt in a single step, the greater the degree of global cooperation finally attained. When learning errors can occur on an arbitrarily non-cooperative population, we have showed that a higher-investment mutant spreads all over the system raising cooperation to significant levels in regimes of low costs (with linear or non-linear benefits) and medium costs. The larger the cost, the greater the resistance to imitation needed in a single step. However, in more adverse conditions of high costs, occasional errors work against cooperation and even the resistance is unable to maintain cooperation.
We call attention to the fact that gradual learning can be introduced in a straightforward way into the strategy update rule of any continuous evolutionary game, such as the continuous Snowdrift game [26] and the spatial ultimatum game [27] . Gradual learning can also operate jointly with different selection mechanisms to identify from whom to learn. To compare results with previous literature on spatial the CPD, we have considered learning from the successful neighbor, but the weighted average operator can be easily fitted to random selection criterions [7] . We have only considered weighted average, because it is the natural rule when strategies are represented by real numbers, such as cooperative investments. But different schemas of gradual learning can be considered when strategies are not scalar. Our formulation is quite simple and can be applied in a wide range of scenarios. We hope that this work will contribute to highlighting the relevant role of this evolutionary principle for the study of cooperation.
In conclusion, resistance to imitation provides a natural solution to the evolutionary riddle of the origin and maintenance of cooperation in a world governed by selective forces. Our results suggest that populations which learn slowly from successful partners are, in the long term, more efficient in the sense that they allow for higher cooperative investments. Thus, our model provides an evolutionary version of the tortoise and the hare fable when the goal is cooperation.
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